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Among the most highly-praised Western scholars on historical and contemporary 
religious and cultural issues in the Middle East has been British-American Professor Bernard 
Lewis, whose relatively recent works include New York Times bestseller What Went Wrong? The 
Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East and national bestseller The Crisis of 
Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. In What Went Wrong? Lewis highlights the deterioration of 
scientific discovery in the Muslim world as it occurred with the decline of the Ottoman Empire, 
the rise of Western intellectualism and the Enlightenment as it occurred with the rise of the 
European empires, and the subsequent failure of the Islamic world to modernize at the same rate 
as the West technologically, intellectually, and economically, allowing the West to hold 
dominance over the rest of the world in these aspects. In The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and 
Unholy Terror, Lewis discusses the causes and historical roots of anti-Western sentiments 
carried by today’s radical Islamic groups and how these sentiments pertain to several problems 
prevalent in the Middle East and the Islamic world, such as poverty, economic imbalance, and 
oppressive, often Western-backed, rulers. The two writings convey information in an eloquent 
and scholarly manner, complete with citations of Ottoman sources, traditional Islamic narrations, 
and Quranic verses, so much so that some critics have named Lewis “the world’s foremost 
scholar of Islam”24. 
 Unfortunately, The Crisis of Islam and What Went Wrong? may not possess the amount 
of scholarly accuracy and objectivity that Lewis’s eloquence and neat, formal citations would 
imply. A critical reading of the two works by anyone with an objective background on the 
history of the Middle East, its historical relationship with the West, and the various beliefs of the 
Muslim world reveals several flaws and fallacies in Lewis’s books and puts to doubt the author’s 
objectivity on several issues discussed in them. Examples of such facts and issues whose 
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accuracy and objectivity in the books are put into question include the views of Ottoman officials 
on learning from the West and whether this should be considered to be an unheard-of or 
inconceivable idea at the time, Lewis’s statement that the “formative first generation of 
Muslims” suffered no persecution by a hostile state power, the views and statements of 
Ayatollah Khomeini on various issues, especially those pertaining to women’s rights, and 
Lewis’s views on the roles that the United States played in the Middle East following World War 
II. This critique aims to prove to readers that Orientalists do not always supply the most accurate 
information concerning their area of study, the Middle East, and that any seeker of the truth 
concerning the way Middle Easterners and their history are viewed today should look to reliable 
Middle Eastern historical sources in order to acquire the most objective understanding 
concerning these issues. 
 One of the objectionable claims made by Bernard Lewis in his book What Went Wrong? 
occurs when he attempts to attribute the fact that Ottoman scholars explain the “extraordinary 
deference given to women in Christendom” with the theory that women in Christendom are 
“respected out of love for Mother Mary”. Lewis goes on to state that this theory “should not be 
dismissed as absurd”, explaining that one should bear in mind that “according to Islamic 
tradition, the Trinity, worship of which Islam condemns as near-polytheistic blasphemy, 
consisted of God, Jesus, and Mary”, and following this statement with a citation of Chapter 5 
Verse 119 of the Quran, where Jesus rejects the idea of the Trinity, shown in an answer to a 
question from God: “Did you tell people: ‘Worship me and my mother as gods apart from 
God?’”, to which Jesus replies with “unequivocal denial”25. 
Firstly, the Quranic verse that Lewis attempted to cite was Verse 116 of Chapter 5 and 
not Verse 119
2
, and whether this mistake was due to a typographical error is irrelevant, 
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nevertheless, Verse 116 is often cited by Christians who attempt to refute the Quran as a book 
written by Prophet Mohammad rather than the revelation of God
1
. If we, for the sake of 
argument, assume that this idea is indeed correct and that Prophet Mohammad simply wrote 
about what he perceived as true as he spread his religion through the Arabian Peninsula; that 
Christians believed in the Virgin Mary as the third member of the Trinity, does the fact remain 
that this belief was a misconception? One only has to look at the historical beliefs of the 
Christians of Arabia to know that this so-called misconception was not entirely unfounded. Apart 
from the Ghassanids who rejected the Trinity doctrine of the Nicene Council
6
, there existed other 
sects and movements in Christianity that propagated beliefs different from those of orthodox 
Christianity, such as the Collyridian sect, who preached the belief that the Virgin Mary was to be 
worshipped as a goddess and that offerings were to be made to her. In fact, there existed a group 
at the Nicene Council who held this belief in the divinity of the Virgin Mary, and who said that 
Jesus and Mary were two gods besides God the Father, earning the name “Marianites”14. 
Therefore, at some point in time and at some location, there existed groups of Christians who 
held the belief in the divinity of the Virgin Mary or that she was part of the Trinity, and thus to 
say that Prophet Mohammad was wrong in his alleged assumption would be incorrect. One may 
also make the observation that statues and images of Jesus Christ and his mother the Virgin Mary 
can be found and are venerated in most Orthodox and Catholic churches as sacred statues. It can 
also be observed that the congregations at these churches venerate Jesus Christ as God the Son 
and his mother Mary as the Mother of God, and that these Catholic and Orthodox congregations 
form the majority of Christians in the world. However, in these very churches, an image or statue 
of the Holy Spirit for congregations to venerate has not been established
18
.  
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If one, however, assumes that the Quran is indeed divine revelation and not the writing or 
invention of Prophet Mohammad, it follows that the very words that create the form of the verses 
are eloquent statements from God and that they accept neither addition nor substitution, as the 
verses already portray the teachings of God perfectly as they were meant to be portrayed. With 
this idea, one can read Chapter 4 Verse 171 of the Quran: “O People of the Book! Commit no 
excesses in your religion, nor say of God aught but the truth. Christ Jesus the son of Mary was 
(no more than) an apostle of God, and His Word, which He bestowed on Mary, and a Spirit 
proceeding from Him: so believe in God and His apostles. Say not ‘Trinity’ (in another 
translation, “Say not ‘Three’”1): desist.  It will be better for you: For Allah is One God: Glory be 
to Him: (Far Exalted is He) above having a son. To Him belong all things in the heavens and on 
earth. And enough is Allah as a Disposer of affairs”2. The verse is addressed to the “People of 
the Book”, in context an obvious reference to the Christians, and it describes Jesus Christ as the 
son of the Virgin Mary and a creation and apostle of God, and not the son of God. It also 
denounces the Christian belief in the Trinity explicitly with the word “Trinity” in some 
translations and “Three” in others. If one returns to the original verse in dispute (Chapter 5 Verse 
116), it can be observed that the verse mentions the worship of Jesus and his mother Mary 
alongside God, but also that there is no explicit mention of a Trinity or a “Three”. It can also be 
observed that in the second verse cited (Chapter 4 Verse 171), Mary is mentioned only as the 
mother of the apostle Jesus, and the Trinity mentioned in the verse does not relate to her mention 
in any way. This is because the verse in dispute is not referring to the worship of God as three, 
but the worship of Jesus as the son of God and the worship of Mary as the mother of God, a 
doctrine followed by the majority of ancient and modern Christians, although the worship of 
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Mary as the mother of God was abandoned by the Protestants, who form a minority when 
compared to the Catholic and Orthodox majority worldwide
18
. 
Following these arguments, Lewis’s claim that “according to Islamic tradition, the 
Trinity… consisted of God, Jesus, and Mary” can be said to be founded on either incomplete 
interpretation or blatant misinterpretation that possibly caters to the Western Christian majority 
who may use the claim in attempt to refute Islam and the Quran rather than learn more about 
them, and therefore it is a claim of questionable objectivity that should not have been made in a 
supposedly objective historical work. 
More objectionable claims by Bernard Lewis in his work What Went Wrong? occur when 
he speaks of the “most profound single difference” between Islamic and Western civilizations to 
be the “status of women”, stating that “according to Islamic law and tradition, there were three 
groups of people who did not benefit from the general Muslim principle of legal and religious 
quality – unbelievers, slaves, and women”, with women being the “worst-placed of the three”, 
since “the slave could be freed by his master; the unbeliever could at any time become a believer 
by his own choice, and thus end his inferiority”, but “only the woman was doomed forever to 
remain what she was”. He goes on to tell of the struggle for women’s rights in the Islamic world 
and how these efforts were targeted by “different schools of the militant Islamic revival. The 
Ayatollah Khomeini, in particular, gave it a prominent place in his indictment of the misdeeds of 
the shah and the crimes of his regime. From a traditional point of view, the emancipation of 
women – specifically, allowing them to reveal their faces, their arms, and their legs, and to 
mingle socially in the school or the workplace with men – is an incitement to immorality and 
promiscuity, and a deadly blow to the very heart of Islamic society”  25.  
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The wording that Lewis uses in these excerpts seems all too similar to the Orientalist 
stereotype of Muslim women where they are forced by their husbands and families to cover 
themselves fully from head to toe, including the face, and are only allowed to do what male 
members of their households tell them to do, playing a subordinate role to men of their society. 
This is not to say that this stereotype is entirely unfounded; unfortunately, this image is all too 
familiar in the minds of Westerners, as they have seen it not only in the works of Orientalists but 
also in real life, mostly due to the efforts of a certain oil-rich kingdom on the Persian Gulf that 
claims to rule by the laws of Islamic Sharia. Concerning the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it is a 
state that gained power and continues to maintain control over its citizens through the use and 
empowerment of the Wahhabi ideology originated in the 18
th
 Century by the theologian 
Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahhab of Najd. Although the followers of the Wahhabi ideology form a 
minority in the international Muslim community, the thoughts and practices of the Wahhabi 
school of thought are publicized by Western media as traditional Islam much more than the 
thoughts and practices of the major, more traditional schools of thought, making the Wahhabis a 
very loud and prominent minority. 
Unlike Saudi Islamic laws, which Egyptian scholar Mohammad Al-Ghazali is said to 
have described as “based on a Bedouin jurisprudence and as such can only offer a puerile 
understanding of creed and law”10, traditional Islam granted women rights beyond those afforded 
to Christian and Jewish women at the dawn of Islam. In pre-Islamic Arabia, women could 
“neither own property nor inherit it from their husbands”, in fact they themselves were 
considered property, and both a wife and “her dowry would be inherited by the male heir of her 
deceased husband”, and if the male heir was not interested in the widow, he could hand her over 
to a brother or relative “who could then marry her and take control of her dead husband’s 
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property”, but if the widow is too old to remarry, ownership of herself and her dowry returns to 
her clan
6
. 
The advent of Islam brought with it efforts by Mohammad to provide women with some 
degree of equality and social independence by changing the traditional laws of inheritance and 
marriage and by removing “obstacles that prohibited women from inheriting and maintaining 
their own wealth” 6. For the first time, women were given the right to keep their dowries as their 
own personal property and also the right to inherit property belonging to their husbands. 
Husbands were forbidden from using their wives’ dowries and were forced to use their own 
wealth to provide for their families, as evidenced in Chapter 4 Verse 34 of the Quran: “Men shall 
take full care of women with the bounties which God has bestowed more abundantly on the 
former than one the latter, and with what they may spend out of their possessions. And the 
righteous women are the truly devout ones, who guard the intimacy which God has [ordained to 
be] guarded. And as for those women whose ill-will you have reason to fear, admonish them 
[first]; then leave them alone in bed; then beat them (in another translation, “talk to them 
suasively; then leave them alone in bed [without molesting them] and go to bed with them [when 
they are willing]” 6); and if thereupon they pay you heed, do not seek to harm them. Behold, God 
is indeed most high, great!”5 
For the sake of clarification, the Arabic word “adribuhunna” which appears in the verse 
can be translated to “beat them”, “turn away from them”, “go along with them”, and even “have 
consensual intercourse with them”, depending on the translator’s interpretation6. If one chooses 
to follow the more widely used translation, “beat them”, they should be aware that many 
prominent Muslim scholars, including Muslim, Tirmidhi, Abu Da’ud, Nasa’i, Ibn Majah, Tabari, 
and Razi, agree that this “beating”, if it is resorted to at all, should be only symbolic and only for 
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the purpose of admonishment, to the extent that Tabari quotes early scholars to have said “with a 
toothbrush, or some such thing” and Razi quotes them to have said “with a folded handkerchief”, 
and if this beating leaves so much as a red mark on the woman’s body, she is entitled to report 
her husband to a jurist who would have him penalized for abuse
5
. The verse gives men authority 
of the women of their respective families only in issues where men are proven to be more able to 
conduct and for which men have had a higher affinity, such as judiciary affairs. According to the 
traditional explanation of this verse, a man has no authority or control over “the independence of 
a woman in her individual will and activities; she decides what she wants and acts as she wishes, 
and [he] has no right to interfere in any way – except when she intends to do something 
unlawful”, which is where the measures of admonishment mentioned earlier come into play. The 
purpose of the beginning of the verse is to maintain that the husband, as head of the household, 
must spend his wealth to support his wife and children
34
. 
This also includes wealth acquired from inheritance; although individual male heirs 
receive a larger portion of the inheritance than female heirs, as evidenced by the first portion of 
Chapter 4 Verse 11 of the Quran: “Concerning [the inheritance of] your children, God enjoins 
[this] upon you: the male shall have the equal of two females’ share; but if there are more than 
two females, they shall have two-thirds of what [their parents] leave behind; and if there is only 
one, she shall have one-half thereof…”5, this is only due to the fact that the male has the 
responsibility to spend his wealth to support his family, possibly including the female heirs, 
while the female heir is free to take her share of the inheritance and spend it on whatever she 
wishes. What is also noteworthy concerning this verse is the wording of “the male shall have the 
equal of two females’ share” rather than “the female shall have the equal of half of a male’s 
share” in both the translation and in the original Arabic text, in that it elevates the status of 
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women by treating their share the “yardstick”, so to speak, by which the share of the male heir is 
measured, and this trend of describing the inheritance of a male in relation to a female share is 
continued in the verses that follow
34
. 
As for the claim that traditional Islam in general and Ayatollah Khomeini in specific view 
“the emancipation of women – specifically, allowing them to reveal their faces, their arms, and 
their legs, and to mingle socially in the school or the workplace with men – is an incitement to 
immorality and promiscuity, and a deadly blow to the very heart of Islamic society”, one only 
has to examine the writings and declarations of Ayatollah Khomeini pertaining to the rights and 
responsibilities of women to see that it is unfounded and untrue. When asked about what a return 
to Quranic laws mean for women in the current Islamic Republic of Iran, Khomeini responded 
by saying that in an Islamic system, “women, in their role as human beings, can work alongside 
men to establish Islamic society, but not if they wish to act as mere objects. Women do not have 
the right to lower themselves to such a level, nor do men have the right to think of them as 
such”21. In an address made by Khomeini on March 6, 1979, to a group of women in Qum, Iran, 
Khomeini first praises the efforts the women made in revolting against the Pahlavi regime, 
stating that “in our revolutionary movement, women have likewise earned more credit than 
men”, even while they “fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the men, or even in from of them”, 
since it was “the women who not only displayed courage themselves, but also had reared men of 
courage”, and then concludes by explaining important rights of women in an Islamic system, 
specifically that, before a marriage contract is signed, the woman can “stipulate that if her 
husband turns out to be of corrupt moral character or if he mistreats her, she would possess the 
right to execute a divorce”, contrary to traditional Middle Eastern practice where only the 
husband holds divorce execution rights, and that once the husband accepts such a stipulation, “he 
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can never repudiate it”20. Concerning women’s right to vote in the Islamic Republic, Khomeini is 
quoted to have said “I advise both men and women who are of legal voting age to take part in 
these election and vote for any of the candidates they wish. Participate they must”21, and 
concerning the rights of women to interact with men in either social or professional 
environments, Khomeini is quoted to have said in an interview with German reporters in Paris on 
November 12, 1978, “in the Islamic Republic women have complete freedom in their education, 
in everything that they do, just as men are free in everything”26. 
It is obvious from the quotes above that Ayatollah Khomeini was not against the 
freedoms given to women by the religion of Islam, as Lewis implied with his claim. However, 
there still remains the issue of women exposing their faces, arms, and legs in Muslim society. 
There are verses in the Quran describing modest dress for women and most noteworthy among 
them are Chapter 33 Verse 59: “O Prophet! Tell thy wives and daughters, and the believing 
women, that they should cast their outer garments over their persons [when abroad]: that is most 
convenient, that they should be known [as such] and not molested. And God is Oft-Forgiving, 
Most Merciful”2, and Chapter 24 Verse 31: “and say to the believing women that they should 
lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty and 
ornaments except what [must ordinarily] appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over 
their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands’ 
fathers, their sons, (the list goes on)…; and that they should not strike their feet in order to draw 
attention to their hidden ornaments. And O ye Believers! Turn ye all together towards God, that 
ye may attain Bliss”2. As can be seen from the description given in the two verses, women are 
required to cover their bodies with an “outer garment”, called a “ jilbaab” in Arabic, and must 
extend the veil that already covers their head so that it also covers the chest and neck area. There 
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is no mention of the veiling or covering of the face, as is customary in Saudi Islamic law, and 
many Islamic scholars, including Ayatollah Khomeini, agree that a woman’s face remains 
uncovered when she wears the veil, or hijab. Many Islamic scholars also agree that the wearing 
of the hijab cannot be forced upon a woman and that it is up to them woman to do it of her own 
free will, as expressed by Khomeini in a 1978 interview with The Guardian newspaper in Paris, 
“women are free in the Islamic Republic in the selection of their activities and their future and 
their clothing”26. 
As for Lewis defining the public revealing of women’s arms and legs as modernization 
and “emancipation”, it must be stressed that the hijab was introduced to Islam as a protective 
measure for women and as something that helps women in elevating their status and keeping 
their dignity. The hijab was designed to protect women from being viewed by men and society in 
general as sexual objects, as is common in this day and age, where the number of reports of 
women raped in the highly modernized country of France in 2009 was 10,277
27
. It may be 
argued that a more effective measure of protection would be to allow women to reveal their 
bodies as is practiced in the modern West and to simply educate the public about civilized 
behavior and self-restraint, but this would be a somewhat weak argument, as a fairly recent 
scientific study has shown that when the male brain is exposed to images of women who reveal 
more of their bodies than would be considered modest, the areas of the brain associated with 
handling tools become active, showing that the brain involuntarily depersonalizes the woman 
into a sexual object as an evolutionary response to the need to procreate and spread genes
23
. 
If this is Lewis’s idea of “emancipation” and modernization, where human beings are 
reduced to animals bent on procreation, and where a democratically elected female 
representative of parliament can be insulted from the floor of parliament, dismissed from her 
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position, and even stripped of her citizenship simply because she wore a headscarf while taking 
the oath of office, as did happen in 1998 to Merve Kavakci of the Turkish parliament
6
, then it 
shows how much Lewis cares for the rights and dignity and women. From an Islamic point of 
view, this is not emancipation, but slavery itself. Therefore, the claims made by Bernard Lewis 
concerning the legal quality of women in Islam and the opinions of traditional Islam and 
Ayatollah Khomeini on women’s rights to social and professional lives can be ruled as ignorant, 
unfounded, and lacking in objectivity, and are claims that should not have been made in a 
supposedly objective book of history. 
Another objectionable claim by Bernard Lewis in What Went Wrong? occurs when Lewis 
discusses attempts by the Ottoman Empire to keep up with new technology and techniques made 
available by their Christian rivals. He states that in the 18
th
 Century, Western visitors arrived in 
the Ottoman Empire to teach Ottoman officials new techniques. According to Lewis, “for 
Muslims, first in Turkey and later elsewhere, this [type of arrangement] brought a shocking new 
idea – that one might learn from the previously despised infidel”. He later goes even further with 
this claim when he describes the way the Ottomans began sending students to study in Western 
countries, stating that “it is difficult for a Westerner to appreciate the magnitude of this change, 
in a society accustomed to despise the infidel barbarians beyond the frontiers of civilization. 
Even travelling abroad was suspect; the idea of studying under infidel teachers was 
inconceivable” and calling it a “radical change” where “the scientific current had broken against 
the dikes of literature and jurisprudence” 24. 
A careful examination of the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad and major Islamic 
scholars  and also of the Islamic historical narrations and traditions reveals that the idea of 
learning from the “despised infidel”, by which Lewis refers to a non-Muslim, was neither as 
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shocking nor as inconceivable as Lewis makes it out to be.  The seeking of knowledge is an area 
that both the Quran and the Prophet Mohammad emphasized on many occasions. In fact, such 
emphasis is placed in the very first word of the very first verse revealed of the Quran, Chapter 96 
Verse 1, which commands the Prophet, “Read in the name of thy Sustainer, who has created”22. 
Many traditions quote the Prophet Mohammad where he encouraged and his Muslim community 
to seek knowledge without specifying limitations on the people or locations that can be a source 
of knowledge, and a few of them are: “seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave”; “the 
acquisition of knowledge is a duty incumbent on every Muslim, male and female”; “that person 
who shall pursue the path of knowledge, God will direct him to the path of Paradise”; “to listen 
to the words of the learned, and to instill into others the lessons of science, is better than rel igious 
exercises”32; and “a word of wisdom is an item the believer pursues; anywhere he finds it, he is 
worthy of it”4. More specific to the seeking of knowledge from sources outside a Muslim 
environment, the Prophet is also narrated to have said “seek knowledge even as far as China”, 
which, at the time and arguably to this day, was considered a non-Muslim source even more 
distant from the society that the Prophet lived in than the Persian Empire, who were also 
considered pagans at the time. “Knowledge” in this narration is also more likely to be a reference 
to scientific rather than religious knowledge, as China was known to have deep knowledge in the 
fields of medicine and literature, as well as the making of paper and the use of gunpowder
9
. 
In addition to the Prophet Mohammad, there are important figures in Islamic history who 
also emphasized the acquisition of knowledge an wisdom without limiting the source of 
knowledge, such as Mohammad’s cousin and son-in-law Ali bin Abu Talib, who is narrated to 
have said “acquire wisdom and truth from whomever you can because even an apostate can have 
them but unless they are passed over to a faithful Muslim and become part of wisdom and truth 
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that he possesses, they have a confused existence in the minds of apostates”, and “knowledge 
and wisdom are really the privilege of a faithful Muslim. If you have lost them, get them back 
even though you may have to get them from the apostates”16. The Imam Musa ibn Jafar, a highly 
influential scholar who died around 799 C.E. and was a descendant of both Prophet Mohammad 
and Ali bin Abu Talib, also remarked on the importance of the acquisition of knowledge no 
matter where the source, and is narrated to have said “speaking to a scholar even at a dump-site 
is better than speaking to an ignorant person at a best furnished palace”3. 
One can also examine the events after the Battle of Badr to discover that learning from 
the non-Muslim was not a new idea at all by the 18
th
 Century. 313 Muslims from Medina led by 
Prophet Mohammad fought against around 1000 pagans from Mecca led by the tribe of Quraysh. 
The Muslims suffered 14 casualties while 70 Meccans were killed and around 70 were captured. 
The Prophet is said to have consulted two of his companions concerning the fate of the prisoners; 
one of them recommended executing them, and the other recommended freeing them after the 
payment of a ransom. The Prophet decided to ransom the prisoners whose families were wealthy 
enough to pay the ransom, and released those belonging to poorer families under the condition 
that they each teach ten Muslims how to read and write. Those who were both poor and illiterate 
were set free without ransom
30
.  
Therefore, upon study of these traditions and historical narrations, it can be concluded 
that the claim that learning from the “infidel” in the 18th Century was a radically new and 
inconceivable idea for Muslims in the Ottoman Empire is utterly false, as Islam had already 
established the attainment of knowledge regardless of whether the source was inside or outside 
of Muslim society during the time of Prophet Mohammad himself and this practice continued 
even after the Prophet’s death. 
Jawad 16 
 
Yet another objectionable claim by Bernard Lewis occurs in The Crisis of Islam, where 
Lewis attempts to compare the beginnings of Christianity and Islam, claiming that early 
Christians were, in a manner of speaking, a persecuted opposition party to the pagan Romans. 
“In pagan Rome”, Lewis states, “Caesar was God. For Christians, there is a choice between God 
and Caesar, and endless generations of Christians have been ensnared in that choice”. 
Meanwhile, when he speaks of Islam’s beginning, he states that “in Islam, there was no such 
painful choice. In the universal Islamic polity as conceived by Muslims, there is no Caesar but 
only God, who is the sole sovereign and the sole source of law. Muhammad was His Prophet, 
who during his lifetime both taught and ruled on God’s behalf”. Lewis culminates the idea with 
the statement that, as opposed to what occurred at the beginning of Christianity, “for the 
formative first generation of Muslims, whose adventures are the sacred history of Islam, there 
was no protracted testing by persecution, no tradition of resistance to a hostile state power. On 
the contrary, the state that ruled them was that of Islam, and God’s approval of their cause was 
made clear to them in the form of victory and empire in this world”24. 
If, by “formative first generation of Muslims”, Lewis meant the Prophet Mohammad and 
his companions who began spreading Islam in Mecca then moved to Medina, then this claim not 
only puts to doubt the credibility of Bernard Lewis as an expert on Islam but also the credibility 
of critics who would praise him and call him “the world’s foremost scholar of Islam”. It does not 
take a scholar to read any work on the history of Islam and learn that the very first generation of 
Muslims did in fact suffer persecution because of their beliefs at the hands of the dominant force 
in the region at the time, the powerful Meccans of Quraysh. When Prophet Mohammad began to 
preach his religion, the leaders of Quraysh recognized it not only as a challenge to the religious 
beliefs held by the Meccans at the time, but also as a challenge to the social customs of Mecca, 
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and warned the Prophet’s uncle Abu Talib that they will fight Mohammad until he ceases his 
message, and offered that if Mohammad sought leadership or wealth through this new religion 
they would grant them to him once he has desisted, to which the Prophet made his famous reply 
“I swear by God, if they put the sun in my right hand and the moon in my left on condition that I 
abandon this course before He has made it victorious, or I have perished therein, I would not 
abandon it”28. At this point, the Prophet and his followers became subject to persecution from the 
people of Mecca. The Quraysh prevented the Prophet and his followers from praying at the 
Kaaba; the Prophet and his companions were pursued and covered with dirt and filth, and the 
places they frequented for prayer and meditation had thorns scattered in them by the Meccans
17
. 
Notable among the Quraysh leaders for his persecution of the Prophet was Abu Hakam (“Father 
of Wisdom”), whose venomous attitude toward the Prophet and his followers resulted in his 
name being changed to Abu Jahl (“Father of Ignorance”) in traditional Islamic narrations28. In 
fact, Abu Jahl was known to be involved in the torture and death of Islam’s first martyr, 
Sumayya bint Khubbat, the mother of the renowned companion of Prophet Mohammad, Ammar 
bin Yasir, and to whom the Prophet himself had given tidings of Heaven
33
. 
Another of the famous stories of persecution of first-generation Muslims by the people of 
Quraysh was the story of Bilal, the Abyssinian slave of the tribal leader Umayya. It is reported 
that Umayya would “have Bilal dragged to the hot Arabian desert, where he would place large 
stone blocks on Bilal’s chest and threaten to leave him there until Bilal renounced God and 
accepted the [pagan] goddesses Lat and Uzza. Bilal simply repeated: ‘Ahad, Ahad’ (‘One, 
One’)”28. When the persecution intensified, the Prophet Mohammad began sending small waves 
of his followers to Abyssinia, to be under the just and tolerant rule of the Christian king Al-
Najashi, known to the West as Negus
17
. When Abu Talib continued to protect the Prophet, the 
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leaders of Quraysh decided to extend their punishment over the entirety of Abu Talib’s clan, the 
Beni Hashim. A decree to boycott the Beni Hashim was hung on the Kaaba stating that the tribe 
of Quraysh will “renounce all intercourse with the children of Hashim – neither to buy nor sell, 
neither to marry nor to give in marriage, but to pursue them with implacable enmity, till they 
should deliver the person of Mohammad to the justice of the gods”  14. As a result of this boycott, 
Prophet Mohammad’s beloved wife, Khadija, who had spent all of her wealth in support of the 
new religion, and his uncle Abu Talib, who had sponsored and protected the Prophet since 
childhood, died within the same year, a year that the Prophet named “the Year of Sadness”28. 
The Prophet resolved to move to the town of Taif in an attempt to gain some followers there, but 
he was received coldly by the tribe of Thaqif, the inhabitants of Taif who refused to hear his 
teachings and even drove him out of the town, and thus the Prophet returned to Mecca a month 
later
17
. 
After the passage of some time, the Prophet Mohammad was approached by travelers 
from the city of Yathrib (modern-day Medina) who offered their allegiance to him and asked him 
to settle the hereditary tribal disputes between the tribes of Aws and Khazraj. The Prophet began 
to send waves of his followers to Yathrib and stayed behind until he was prepared to flee Mecca 
as well
17
. But even while he prepared to leave and conduct his famous Hijra, the leaders of 
Quraysh, led by Abu Sufyan, plotted the assassination of Mohammad by sending a member from 
each of the major tribes of Mecca so that each assassin may strike the Prophet in his bed, 
spreading the guilt of Mohammad’s blood throughout the tribes and baffling any attempt at 
revenge by the Beni Hashim. The Prophet was somehow made aware of this plot, however, and 
escaped secretly at night while his cousin Ali bin Abu Talib lied in Mohammad’s bed as a decoy, 
to the surprise of the Meccan assassins
14
. As a result of the failed assassination attempt, the 
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leaders of Quraysh placed a bounty of one hundred camels on the Prophet’s head17. Even after 
successfully reaching the city of Yathrib, the Prophet had to fight three major battles against the 
Meccans of Quraysh: the Battle of Badr, where 313 Muslims defeated 1000 pagans; the Battle of 
Uhud, where the Prophet lost his beloved youngest uncle Hamza bin Abdul Muttalib; and the 
Battle of Khandaq, where the city of Yahtrib itself was besieged by ten thousand pagans
28
. 
After signing the Treaty of Hudaibiya, which guaranteed that hostilities between Mecca 
and Yathrib would cease for ten years, the Prophet Mohammad began to gather great numbers of 
followers from the surrounding Arab and non-Arab tribes, but when the Quraysh violated the 
agreement by attacking a clan that was allied with the Muslims, the Prophet marched on the city 
of Mecca with ten thousand Muslims, conquering it with minimal resistance. It must be noted 
that this was the first time in seven years the Prophet set foot in his beloved hometown, since he 
was forced to flee to Yathrib during the Hijra as a result of his persecution by the Quraysh
17
. 
After this brief study of early Islamic history, it can be seen as fairly obvious that the first 
generation Muslims did in fact face persecution by the people in power at the time, and that the 
religion did not simply succeed without any hardship or resistance. It can therefore also be 
concluded that Bernard Lewis’s claim that the first generation of Muslims suffered no 
persecution or resistance by a hostile state power is utterly false and blatantly ill-informed, and 
can also be viewed as an attempt by Lewis to emotionally distance his Western Christian 
audience from the early Muslims by making this false claim in a comparison with how much 
early Christians suffered persecution under Roman rule. Both Christianity and Islam were 
religions that challenged the customs and practices of the societies they reached and the powers 
that governed them, and thus both religions faced a great deal of resistance and oppression before 
they succeeded and became widespread. 
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In The Crisis of Islam, Bernard Lewis also makes some objectionable claims concerning 
the reasons and extent of interference of the United States in the Middle East during and after the 
Cold War. While commenting on the collapse of the Soviet Union, which “left the United States 
as the sole world superpower”, Lewis states that “it seemed that the era of imperial rivalry had 
ended with the withdrawal of both rivals – the Soviet Union because it couldn’t, the United 
States because it wouldn’t play the imperial role”, and that events such as the wars of Saddam 
Hussein and the Iranian Revolution “forced the United States to involve itself more directly in 
the affairs of the region”, which Middle Easterners saw as a “a new phase in an old imperial 
game”, while Americans “did not, and showed that they had neither the desire nor the aptitude 
for an imperial role”24. 
The word “imperialism” is defined by the Dictionary of Human Geography as “the 
creation and/or maintenance of an unequal economic, cultural, and territorial relationship, 
usually between states and often in the form of an empire, based on domination and 
subordination”15. With this knowledge, one can examine the policies practiced by the United 
States in the Middle East during the Cold War. In July 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
received a report from the National Security Council titled “United States Objectives and 
Policies with Respect to the Near East”. Under the section “Objectives” is a list that includes the 
following: “availability to the United States and its allies of the resources, the strategic position, 
and the passage rights of the area and the denial of such resources and strategic positions to the 
Soviet bloc”, “stable, viable, friendly governments in the area, capable of withstanding 
communist-inspired subversion from within and willing to resist communist aggression”, and 
“prevention of the extension of Soviet influence in the area”, among other goals pertaining to 
reversing anti-American sentiments in the region and bringing peace between the Arabs and 
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Israel
13
. After reviewing the definition of imperialism and then reexamining the first two items 
listed in the report, a critical reader may judge for himself whether the guarantee of the 
availability of the resources of another state that is supposedly sovereign for the advantage of the 
United States and the disadvantage of the Soviet Union through the placement and maintenance 
of a government that may or may not be efficient or just in ruling its population, as long as it is 
friendly  and expedient to the United States and resistant to communism, can be seen as imperial 
rule based on dominance or subordination. 
If these theoretical policies are not enough to reveal the imperialist tendencies of the 
United States during the Cold War, the coup d’etat that occurred in 1953 Iran can provide a more 
practical example. In 1951, nationalist Iranian politician Mohammad Mosaddeq gained the 
leadership of the Iranian parliament, the Majlis, as the country’s new prime minister. Because the 
British had maintained absolute control over Iranian oil production since the concessions given 
to William D’Arcy in 1901, any attempt by the Iranian parliament to increase Iran’s share of the 
profits were hindered. The Iranian assembly under the command of Mosaddeq therefore voted to 
nationalize Iran’s oil resources and remove them from the control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company
19. This move by Mosaddeq was part of his nonalignment policy of “negative 
equilibrium”, where the Iranian government would not take sides in the Cold War by a method 
very different from that of the Qajar dynasty, whose nonalignment policy consisted of granting 
equal concessions to both Britain and Russia so that both are appeased
13
. In response to this bold 
move, Britain began persuading the world’s oil companies to boycott Iranian oil, which, in the 
case of the United states, was successful since major American oil companies had recently 
suffered losses due to the nationalization of Mexican oil, making the idea of oil-producing 
countries “nationalizing ‘their’ assets” a particularly disadvantageous one19. Anti-Mosaddeq 
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sentiments began developing among the Iranian public because of this blow to the Iranian 
economy, and these sentiments intensified among the conservative elements of society with the 
help of British intelligence and one hundred thousand dollars from the CIA, who “claimed that 
Mosaddeq’s movement was being manipulated by communists”. In 1953, the army seized 
control of the country, ousting Mosaddeq and restoring the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah, an 
authoritarian despot who sentenced Mosaddeq to house arrest until his death and who would 
torment his people for more than 25 years, but who was allowed to maintain his power simply 
because he was friendly to the United States and Britain
13
. 
Later in The Crisis of Islam, Lewis establishes that the “former colonial subjects in the 
Middle East” see America as “tainted by the same kind of imperialism as Western Europe”, but 
while the Soviet Union, “which retained and extended the imperial conquests of the czars of 
Russia, ruled with no light hand over tens of millions of Muslim subjects in Central Asia and in 
the Caucasus”, it “suffered no similar backlash of anger and hatred from the Arab community” as 
the United States did
24
. Firstly, this interchanging of the terms “Muslim” and “Arab” can be very 
misleading to an uninformed audience, especially since it follows a reference to how America 
was named “the Great Satan” after the Iranian Revolution. The Arab world and the Muslim 
world are two distinct entities and must especially be treated as such if one is to discuss the 
Middle East during the Cold War and how secular Arab nationalist regimes formed. Secondly, 
this statement by Lewis is not entirely accurate, as countries that were both Arab and Muslim 
had conflicting views on who to side with during the Cold War. A good example of such a 
schism occurred during the civil war that was fought in Yemen from 1962 to 1967 between the 
country’s socialist Republicans and its royalists. Legitimizing their point of view with the fight 
against atheistic communism, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, Jordan, and the Gulf countries used 
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Islamic rhetoric to back Yemeni royalists, even going so far as enlisting the help of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the secular, Republican-backing, Arab nationalist countries of Egypt, Syria, and 
Iraq
19
. The civil war in Yemen served as a proxy war between the secular Arab nationalist 
republics in the region and the monarchies that claimed to rule by the laws of Islam, and this 
proxy war in turn served as a proxy war between the United States, which backed the 
monarchies, and the Soviet Union, which backed the Arab nationalists. Therefore it can neither 
be said that all of the Arab countries favored the Soviet Union, nor can it be said that all of the 
Muslim countries despised the United States. 
A major factor in the current views that Middle Easterners hold concerning the United 
States has been its relationship with the state of Israel, which Lewis claims in The Crisis of Islam 
to be “a consequence, not a cause, of Soviet penetration” in the surrounding region24. This claim 
is debatable in that the Soviet Union was known to be a nearly supporter of the state of Israel, as 
the local Jewish community, the Yishuv, had a socialist ideology that had led Russian leadership 
to believe that Israel would be more committed to Soviet goals. The Soviet Union had supported 
the UN resolution that promised the Jews 55% of the Palestinian land, and also supplied Israel 
with arms that helped it win its war of independence. In fact, the Soviet Union was the first 
country to give Israel “full de jure recognition”, and even though the United States had 
recognized Israel first, this recognition had been de facto and full recognition had not been 
extended by the United States until early 1949. The souring of relations between Israel and the 
Soviet Union was brought about by Israeli reliance upon American economic aid and its 
denunciation of North Korea during the Korean War, combined with Russian anti-Semitism and 
several policies that were starkly anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli, such as the detainment of Jewish 
“economic criminals” in 1952 and Jewish doctors accused of conspiring against the Soviet 
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government in 1953, resulting in Israel seeking a bilateral defense treaty with the United States. 
This in turn resulted in the Soviet Union supporting the enemies of Israel, the Arab nationalist 
states in the region, the most important of whom being Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
in an effort to challenge Western influence in the area, outflank NATO, and undermine the 
Baghdad Pact
8
.  It can therefore be said that Soviet penetration in the Arab states of the region 
surrounding Israel was due to the United States’ relationship and involvement with the state of 
Israel. 
An exploration of the extent of Western interference in Middle Eastern affairs brings us 
to another of the objectionable claims made by Bernard Lewis in The Crisis of Islam where he 
describes a demonstration that took place in Islamabad, Pakistan, during the seizure of the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca. The demonstration had been in support of the rebels who seized the Mosque 
and fought the Saudi security forces, and, due to a rumor that had been circulating and that was 
“endorsed by Ayatollah Khomeini, who was then in the process of establishing himself as the 
revolutionary leader in Iran – that American troops had been involved in the clashes in Mecca”, 
“the American Embassy was attacked by a crowd of Muslim demonstrators, and two Americans 
and two Pakistani employees were killed”. Before continuing to describe how relations between 
Iran and the United States deteriorated after the Iranian Revolution, Lewis asks rhetorically, 
“why had Khomeini stood by a report that was not only false but wildly improbable?”24 
Before evaluating Lewis’s claim that the report was false and improbable, one must first 
recount the events that surrounded the demonstrations that occurred in Islamabad, namely, the 
siege of Mecca. On the morning of November 20, 1979, after pre-dawn prayers had just been 
concluded in the Grand Mosque of Mecca, a group of rebels led by the Bedouin preacher 
Juhayman bin Sayf Al-Uteybi seized the Grand Mosque, armed with weapons smuggled in over 
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a period of time in coffins. The gates of the Mosque were chained shut and snipers were posted 
on the minarets, ordered to shoot government soldiers without pity or hesitation. Juhayman and 
his followers then proceeded to spread among the pilgrims and worshippers at the Mosque their 
message of how the Saudi government was unworthy of leadership of Muslims and how it has 
been supportive of Western interference and influence that would corrupt and promote heresy in 
Saudi society. The rebels then presented Juhayman’s brother-in-law, Mohammad Abdullah Al-
Qahtani, and began pledging allegiance to him as the awaited Mahdi, the prophesized savior of 
Islam who would restore justice to the world after it had been filled with corruption and injustice. 
The Grand Mosque was surrounded by Saudi security forces led by Princes Nayef and Sultan bin 
Abdul Aziz, and a strategic perimeter was formed
35. According to Lewis’s brief report on the 
matter, “after some hard fighting, the rebels were suppressed. Their leader was executed on 
January 9, 1980, along with sixty-two of his followers, among them Egyptians, Kuwaitis, 
Yemenis, and citizens of other Arab countries”24. 
This was a very sensitive event in Saudi history, as the royal family of Al Saud 
legitimizes its right to rule as the pious followers of the Sheikh Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, 
the founder of the Wahhabi school of thought. If someone were to rise up while accusing Al 
Saud of impiety, with a ruler as legitimate as the awaited Mahdi, and while seizing the most holy 
site in Islam, no less, their legitimacy and religious authority would surely be questioned. Since 
the grand Mosque of Mecca was the holiest site of Islam, killing was strictly forbidden in on the 
premises. Desperate measures had to be taken, however. With backing from the Grand Mufti of 
Saudi Arabia and thirty clerics, the Saudi Ministry of Interior publicly declared the rebels 
Kharijites, meaning “renegades” or “deviators from Islam”. Lethal action was therefore taken 
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and lasted until the alleged Mahdi was slain and the rebels, along with their leader, were captured 
and publicly executed
35
. 
The demonstrations that occurred in Islamabad took place after rumors had spread that 
those who had desecrated the Grand Mosque were in fact Americans and Zionists. Obviously, it 
was not American troops who took over the Mosque on November 20, 1979, therefore this rumor 
can be concluded to be false, and since non-Muslims have historically to this day been forbidden 
entry to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, it is safe to say that the rumor is also “wildly 
improbable”. Recent reports, however, show that while it was not the troops of America who 
were involved in the clashes that occurred during those weeks, foreign intervention was sought 
and granted not only by the United States but also by France. According to award-winning 
journalist Yaroslav Trofimov’s The Siege of Mecca, which based its reports on recently 
declassified CIA documents, “a quick conversion” to Islam of the horde of CIA operatives who 
arrived in Mecca remedied the problem of non-Muslims entering the holy city, and “the agency’s 
spooks made a rapid tour of the battlefield” to evaluate the giving of tear gas and smoke 
equipment to Saudi security forces. This resort to chemical warfare, however, “proved to be a 
complete fiasco”, as the gas inserted into the Mosque’s basement system, known as the Qaboo, 
rose to the surface, meeting ill-prepared Saudi soldiers in the Mosque’s courtyard and 
incapacitating them
35
. According to another report from Jeddah, the CIA had recommended that 
Saudi soldiers flood the Qaboo, resulting in any rebels that survive drowning being forced to the 
surface for immediate capture
31
.  
The Saudi government later enlisted the help of the French GIGN, who sent a team of 
commandos led by Paul Barril to evaluate the situation and to train Saudi soldiers in tactics. 
After supplies for assault arrived from France, including 150 flak jackets and 300 kilograms of 
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CB gas, Barril, “by his own account, briefly sneaked into the holy city and into the Grand 
Mosque itself before the attack on the compound began”. As advised by the GIGN, crews of 
workers began to drill holes in the floors of the Mosque in order for CB canisters to be fired 
through them at rebels waiting in the Qaboo below. Saudi soldiers soon detonated their CB 
canisters, “stunning the rebels trapped underneath in a cloud of powerful toxins”. Around 100 
soldiers descended into the Qaboo armed with motor-powered CB-spraying devices that pumped 
“rising clouds of gas into the narrow passageways”, followed by units armed with machine guns. 
The fighting in the Qaboo continued until Juhayman himself was captured and brought to the 
surface
35
. 
Though the report that resulted in the bloodshed that occurred at the American Embassy 
in Islamabad was false, the claim that Americans  and other Western powers were involved in 
the conflict that took place in Mecca is not entirely unfounded, as members of the CIA were 
converted to Islam specifically to enter the holy city and supply Saudi troops with weapons and 
training, and a member of the GIGN admitted to entering the city secretly, a report agreed upon 
by some American officials. Since Trofimov’s report was published years after The Crisis of 
Islam, it is based on newly uncovered information, and newer editions of Lewis’s book, if they 
should be published in the future, should be updated with this information in order to give 
Lewis’s audience a better view of the extent of the involvement of the West in Middle Eastern 
affairs that reaches even a location such as Mecca, considered by the majority of Middle 
Easterners to be the least susceptible to penetration by foreign powers. 
 These have been just a few of the objectionable claims that Bernard Lewis makes in What 
Went Wrong? and The Crisis of Islam, and there are many others, such as the simplistic and 
baseless claim that “a significant number of Muslims – notably but not exclusively those whom 
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we call fundamentalists – are hostile and dangerous not because we (the United States) need an 
enemy but because they do”24, but these claims are left up to the truth-seeking reader to research 
and critique for himself. Instead the Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis himself will be critiqued 
through what other scholars and analysts have reported about him. 
 Fouad Ajami, a senior fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institute and a self-proclaimed 
disciple of Bernard Lewis claims that Lewis is “the great Orientalist of our time, and we shan’t 
see the likes of him again” and that Lewis had foreseen the advent and effects of Islamic 
fundamentalism before it occurred. Ajami, however, is part of a “tight circle of admirers”, 
composed of “influential policymakers, many of whom served in the administration of President 
George W. Bush”, including “former Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, Defense Policy Board Chair Richard Perle, Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, 
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and National Security Council for Near East and 
North African Director Elliott Abrams”7. 
Much of this admiration can be attributed to the situation in the United States following 
the events of September 11
th, 2001, when “American foreign policy under George W. Bush was 
conducted by a group of men with whom Lewis was well-acquainted”, giving him “rare access to 
the White House” and a chance to develop what he reported to be a “quite friendly relationship 
with Cheney”. In fact, President Bush himself reportedly read a copy of What Went Wrong? 
given to him by Condoleezza Rice, “who also met privately with Lewis, according to reports”. 
Former Senior Advisor and Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove is said to have invited Lewis to 
“address White House staffers, military aides and staff members of the National Security Council 
in a closed meeting, where Lewis reportedly discussed the failures of contemporary Arab and 
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Muslim societies and shared his opinions about the origins of the Muslim world’s anti-
Americanism”7. 
The types of admirers Lewis has should help the reader decide whether Lewis is a scholar 
seeking a truthful and objective understanding of another culture’s history or a mercenary hired 
by people of power to legitimize their points of view when they are challenged by the other 
culture. Michael Hirsh, author of the 2004 article “Bernard Lewis Revisited”, claims that Lewis’s 
credentials as an expert in Oriental studies gave the policies of the Bush administration 
“intellectual credence”, adding that “it was a mistake to say [that 9/11] was an expression of 
anger that represented the mainstream of the Arab and Muslim world… really, the U.S. had to 
just wipe out Al Qaeda, but instead, they took on the entire Arab world. That’s where people like 
Lewis led us astray and I don’t think anyone would cite him today without some sense of 
irony… by his own volition, he left the academic world to become a political figure and that was 
the beginning of the end of his reputation”7. 
Bernard Lewis is also known to have drawn much controversy with his remarks on the 
severity of the Armenian genocide. In the first edition of his book The Emergence of Modern 
Turkey, published in 1961, and in the second edition published seven years later, Lewis “had 
termed the Armenian genocide a ‘holocaust’”. In the third edition published in 2002, however, 
“he had a change of heart, replacing ‘holocaust’ with the word ‘slaughter’ and adding a reference 
to Turkish deaths as well”. Prior to this, in 1985, he went so far as to urge “the U.S. Congress to 
refrain from passing a resolution that would condemn the event as ‘genocide’, and after he 
published a 1993 article on the subject in Le Monde, he was fined a symbolic one franc by 
French courts under the country’s Holocaust-denial laws”. Remarking on the matter, Lewis states 
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that “there is no doubt the Armenians suffered a terrible massacre, but to compare it to what 
happened to the Jews in Nazi Germany is an absurdity”7. 
The Jewish death toll in Nazi-occupied Europe during the Final Solution is estimated to 
be around 5,933,900, amounting to 67% of the total Jewish population in the Nazi-occupied 
territories of Europe
11
. During the deportations organized by Turkish Minister of the Interior 
Talaat Pasha, which came to be known as the Armenian Massacres of 1915, “hundreds of 
thousands of Armenians eventually succumbed or were killed; Armenian sources have put the 
figure as high as 1,500,000”, and although the exact figures are still under dispute, “there can be 
no disputing the result: Turkish Armenia was destroyed, and about half of its people perished”12. 
While it cannot be denied that the Holocaust that occurred in Nazi Germany had a much higher 
death toll, making it one of the most appalling tragedies of the 20
th
 Century, as it should be 
remembered, why should it be considered an “absurdity” to allow another people who had been 
victimized severely unjustly to remember their victimization as another appalling tragedy? Since 
when was it considered moral to exploit the remembrance of one tragedy at the expense of 
another? Some sources have attributed Lewis’s “change of heart” concerning the Armenian 
genocide to his close ties to the State of Israel; it is claimed that this relationship caused Lewis to 
change his opinions about Turkey when it became the first Muslim state to recognize Israel and 
also its longtime ally
7. If this attribution is true, it shows the extent of Lewis’s credibility as a 
competent and objective historian.  
Speaking of Bernard Lewis, Middle East expert at the University of Denver Nader 
Hashemi has remarked that “Lewis’s reputation within the community of Middle East scholars 
has really sunk to an all-time low”, to the extent that students of Middle Eastern studies believe 
that attending guest-lectures of Lewis may harm their career. While Hashemi includes one of 
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Lewis’s works in his teaching syllabus, it is included “mostly as an example of the kind of 
Orientalist scholarship students should learn to avoid”. Hashemi also claims that “Lewis is a 
medievalist and he tries to interpret contemporary Islamic politics by going back to an earlier 
time period where an ‘essential’ Islam allegedly existed. He uses this framework to explain 
events that happen half a millennium later. He plays into a neoconservative right-wing agenda 
that wants to control, manipulate and dominate the Middle East. His apocalyptic narrative fits 
well with a Fox News audience, but it’s not serious political analysis or scholarship”, adding that 
“he assumes there is a fossilized Muslim core that determines the way Muslims will always 
behave and ignores changing social conditions in the Middle East”7. 
But perhaps the most famous of Bernard Lewis’s critics was the late Columbia University 
professor Edward Said, who accused Lewis of “demagogy and downright ignorance”7 and 
claimed that his writing was “full of condescension and bad faith”29. He also claimed that 
Lewis’s writing can be used as a “perfect exemplification of the academic whose work purports 
to be liberal objective scholarship but is in reality very close to being propaganda against his 
subject material”. Said has also made the claim that “according to Lewis, Islam, does not 
develop, and neither do Muslims; they merely are, and they are to be watched”, a claim that is 
similar to one made by Nader Hashemi. Concerning Lewis’s objectivity when speaking of 
matters pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Said stated that “he will, for example, recite the 
Arab case against Zionism… without at the same time mentioning – anywhere, in any of his 
writings – that there was such a thing as a Zionist invasion and colonization of Palestine despite 
and in conflict with the native Arab inhabitants. No Israeli would deny this, but Lewis the 
Orientalist historian simply leaves it out”, along with any mention of the Emergency Defense 
Regulations used in Israel “to rule the Arabs”, the preventive detention of Arabs by Israel, the 
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illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza, and the absence 
of human rights for Arabs, “principal among them the right of immigration, in former Palestine”. 
Said’s views on Lewis may be summarized with his statement that “Lewis’s verbosity scarcely 
conceals both the ideological underpinnings of his position and his extraordinary capacity for 
getting nearly everything wrong”29. 
Following these reports and following a critical look at some of the claims made by 
Bernard Lewis in his relatively recent works What Went Wrong? and The Crisis of Islam, it can 
be concluded that even with Lewis’s eloquent and scholar-like writing ability and his neat 
citations, there are severe flaws in his writing and his ability to convey historical facts in an 
objective manner. The aim of historical study is to be able to observe the actions and reactions 
that made the world as it is today, and from these observations gain a better understanding of 
other peoples, cultures, and belief systems in order to allow them to coexist in peace and 
harmony. Lewis’s writing does not offer this understanding, rather, it drives his Western 
Christian audience to see Arabs and Muslims as an ancient opponent, as an “other”29 that rivals 
the Christian world in an epic “clash of civilizations”7, and in this way Lewis seeks to legitimize 
the policies and military campaigns of his benefactors, the influential men of power who seek 
what is arguably imperialistic control and hegemony in the Middle East. Therefore, the critically-
thinking truth-seeker should pay no heed to the claims of such mercenary scholars, and should 
instead gather knowledge of other cultures from those other cultures in order to gain full 
appreciation of them and be able to critique them in an honest manner after gaining an objective 
understanding of them. 
 
Jawad 33 
 
References: 
1) Ahmed, Mustafa, and M. S. Saifullah. “Mary, A Part of Trinity?” Islamic Awareness. 1 Sept. 
1999. Web. 12 Mar. 2012. <http://www.islamic-
awareness.org/Quran/Contrad/External/marytrin.html>. 
2) Ali, Abdullah Yusuf, trans. The Holy Qur'an. Brentwood, MD: Amana, 1983. Print. 
3) Al-Kulayni, Muhammad. Kitab Al-Kafi. Trans. Muhammad Sarwar. Vol. 1. Islamic Seminary, 
2012. PDF. 
4) Al-Maqdisi, Muhammad. “Islamic Etiquette and Applicable Grants.” Islamweb. Web. 26 Mar. 
2012. <http://www.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?idfrom=218>. 
5) Asad, Muhammad, trans. The Message of the Qur'an. Gibraltar: Dar Al-Andalus, 1980. Print. 
6) Aslan, Reza. No God but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam. New York: Random 
House Trade Paperbacks, 2006. Print. 
7) Berman, Daphna. “The Revered and Reviled Bernard Lewis.” Moment Magazine. Sept.-Oct. 
2011. Web. 18 Oct. 2011. <http://www.momentmag.com/moment/issues/2011/10/lewis.html>.  
8) Bickerton, Ian J., and Carla L. Klausner. A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Boston: Prentice 
Hall, 2010. Print. 
9) Daiyu, Wang. “Authenticity of ‘Seek Knowledge Even as Far as China’” Islam in China. 6 Nov. 
2006. Web. 26 Mar. 2012. <http://islaminchina.wordpress.com/2007/11/06/authenticity-of-seek-
knowledge-even-as-far-as-china/>. 
10) Dien, Mawil Izzi. Islamic Law: From Historical Foundations to Contemporary Practice. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ., 2004. Print. 
11) “Estimated Number of Jews Killed in The Final Solution.” Jewish Virtual Library. Web. 22 Apr. 
2012. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/killedtable.html>. 
12) Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of 
the Modern Middle East. New York: H. Holt, 2001. Print. 
13) Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: A History. New York: Oxford UP, 2011. Print. 
Jawad 34 
 
14) Gibbon, Edward, and Felipe Fernández-Armesto. Mohammed and the Rise of the Arabs. London: 
Folio Society, 1988. Print. 
15) Gregory, Derek, and Ronald John. Johnston. Dictionary of Human Geography. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2000. Print. 
16) Ibn Abu Talib, Ali. Peak of Eloquence: Nahjul Balagha. Comp. Al-Sharif Al-Radi. 2009. PDF. 
17) Ibn Kathir, Ismail. Stories of the Prophets. Trans. Muhammad M. Geme'ah. Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia: International Islamic House, 1996. Print. 
18) “Is Mary Regarded as Third of Trinity?” Most Merciful. 3 Sept. 2002. Web. 12 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.mostmerciful.com/mary.htm>. 
19) Khalidi, Rashid. Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East. 
Boston: Beacon, 2009. Print. 
20) Khomeini, Ruhollah. Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini. Trans. 
Hamid Algar. Berkeley, Calif.: Mizan, 1981. Print. 
21) Khomeini, Ruhollah. The Position of Women from the Viewpoint of Imam Khomeini. Trans. 
Juliana Shaw and Behrooz Arezoo. Tehran: Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam 
Khomeini's Works, 2001. PDF. 
22) “Knowledge in Islam and How to Seek It.” Islamweb. 14 Oct. 2009. Web. 26 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.islamweb.net/emainpage/index.php?page=articles>. 
23) Landau, Elizabeth. “Men See Bikini-clad Women as Objects, Psychologists Say.” CNN. 19 Feb. 
2009. Web. 19 Mar. 2012. <http://articles.cnn.com/2009-02-
19/health/women.bikinis.objects_1_bikini-strip-clubs-sexism?_s=PM:HEALTH>. 
24) Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. New York: Random House 
Trade Paperbacks, 2004. Print. 
25) Lewis, Bernard. What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East. 
New York: Perennial, 2003. Print. 
Jawad 35 
 
26) Matini, Jalal. “Quotes from Ayatollah Khomeini.” Iran Heritage. Trans. Farhad Mafie. 23 July 
2003. Web. 19 Mar. 2012. <http://www.iran-heritage.org/interestgroups/government-
article2.htm>. 
27) “Rape Statistics - Countries Compared.” Nationmaster. 2011. Web. 19 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/cri_rap-crime-rapes>. 
28) Safi, Omid. Memories of Muhammad: Why the Prophet Matters. New York: HarperOne, 2009. 
Print. 
29) Said, Edward Wadie. Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 1994. Print. 
30) Salaymeh, Lena. “Early Islamic Legal-Historical Precedents: Prisoners of War.” Law and 
History Review 26.3 (2008). History Cooperative. Web. 26 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/lhr/26.3/salaymeh.html>. 
31) Sardar, Ziauddin. “The Battle at Islam's Heart.” New Statesman. 1 Nov. 2007. Web. 10 Apr. 
2012. <http://www.newstatesman.com/books/2007/11/sacred-mosque-saudi-islam>. 
32) “Sayings of the Prophet.” The Wisdom Fund. 1995. Web. 26 Apr. 2012. 
<http://www.twf.org/Sayings/Sayings4.html>. 
33) “Sumayah: The First Martyr.” IslamBasics. Web. 2 Apr. 2012. 
<http://www.islambasics.com/view.php?bkID=176>. 
34) Tabatabai, Muhammad Hussain. “Tafsir File List.” Tafsir Al-Mizan. Web. 19 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.shiasource.com/al-mizan/>. 
35) Trofimov, Yaroslav. The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam's Holiest Shrine and 
the Birth of Al Qaeda. New York: Doubleday, 2007. Print. 
 
 
